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Abstract—Periods of peak consumer demand in today’s elec-
tricity sector are expensive to satisfy and can be the source
of power failures. One possible solution is the use of demand-
side management (DSM) applying dynamic pricing mechanisms.
However, instead of reducing peak loads, these mechanisms can
lead to peak-shifting due to the herding effect of consumers’ load-
shifting behavior. To overcome this problem, we explore strategies
of assigning (non-uniform) participation rates to consumers. We
use a generic method to find a near-optimal distribution setting
for participation rates. Our method allows DSM designers to
tune the system toward consumer convenience. This means less
frequent consumption schedule changes, in the price of system
performance. In addition, consumers do not need to reveal
their detailed consumption schedules (hence, their privacy is
preserved). Using experiments, we show the impact of the herding
effect and evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed solution. We
thereby demonstrate price fairness for consumers. Finally, we
apply our solution to a more realistic environment – one where
consumers change their consumption behavior every day.
I. INTRODUCTION
Today’s electricity sector faces significant challenges.
These include rapidly growing consumption, aging infrastruc-
ture, rising prices, and sustainability. Smart grids hold the
promise of connecting electricity producers, consumers, and
prosumers (who act as both producer and consumer) to a
more efficient, reliable, and sustainable power supply system
[1]. In order to make this vision a reality, smart grids will
have to incorporate several key components, e.g., smart meters
for monitoring real-time usage, enhanced communications
for real-time control and data flow, appropriate sensors for
ensuring system stability, and intelligent energy management
systems as a control mechanism for the benefit of all the actors
connected to the grid.
Demand-side management (DSM) in a smart grid is a
mechanism allowing producers to reduce peak loads by encour-
aging consumers to make more informed decisions about re-
ducing their bills. For example, Figure 1 shows that peak elec-
tricity consumption in a group of Irish residential homes occurs
in the evening. Maximum electricity production capacity must
be calculated to satisfy peak loads. Lower peak loads mean
lower requirements for electricity plant and overall electricity
generation, leading to reduced costs and carbon emissions. One
significant DSM mechanism is dynamic pricing: in order to
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Fig. 1. Hourly average consumption of residential homes in Ireland in
November 2009. Peak hours occur in the evening. Data obtained from CER
smart-metering trial [12], using 782 residential homes belonging to the control
group, with no missing value.
flatten out demand, electricity is priced more expensively at
known periods of high consumer demand [2], [3], [4]. On site
micro-storage capacity for electricity consumers has also been
shown to reduce their costs [5], [6]. Other approaches that
have been considered include: service curves, where consumers
select their future capacity contracts according to their optimal
consumption schedules [7]; demand side bidding, where con-
sumers participate in an auction to fulfill their demand [8],
and where residential consumers participate in the electricity
market to reduce price volatility [9]; and decision support tools
for maximizing consumer benefits from distributed energy
resources [10]. A simulation framework to study demand side
participation has also been built [11].
This paper focuses on a DSM mechanism where dynamic
pricing drives consumers to adjust their consumption behavior.
We particularly address the problem caused by the herding
effect, when the majority of consumers reschedule their elec-
tricity consumption towards the same time slots. Dealing with
the herding effect is essential, because instead of reducing
the peak load, this phenomenon leads to the creation of a
new peak, or peak-shifting [3], [13]. Figure 2 is a simple
illustration of the herding effect. Our approach benefits from
the existence of two-way communication channels between
energy companies and consumers in the smart grid. In addition,
we preserve consumers’ privacy, because consumers do not
need to reveal their detailed consumption schedules.
Our paper’s contribution to solving the herding effect
problem can be summarized as follows:
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Fig. 2. An example of a herding effect. Initially, the peak hour is at t1 with
cost per unit 8 (assuming total cost is quadratic on load). Afterwards, A and B
shift their consumption to t2 (which previously had cost per unit 0). However,
this makes t2 the new peak (peak-shifting). Cost can be reduced if only A or
B (but not both) makes the shift.
• Non-uniform participation rates. Applying a strat-
egy of non-uniform participation rates to consumers
maximizes the effectiveness of the dynamic pricing
DSM mechanism. Furthermore, it is more realistic
than uniform participation rates because the approach
accommodates a population with different levels of
willingness to participate in a DSM program.
• Realistic consumption model. We propose a con-
sumption model, which is able to express different
usage groups to avoid meaningless scheduling result.
• Laziness property. Non-uniform participation rates
also enable us to vary strategy settings. We provide
a framework for adjusting system laziness (for less
frequent schedule changes) in the price of system
performance.
• Experimental evaluation. We evaluate the price fair-
ness of our proposed solution experimentally, as well
as its effectiveness in dynamic environments that are
closer to real-world conditions (daily variations in
consumer consumption).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In
Section II we discuss our consumption model, the pricing
mechanism, and our performance metrics. In Section III, we
describe our approach for finding a near-optimal participation-
rate distribution setting for consumers. In Section IV, we
present our experimental results. We discuss the relevance of
our work in Section V, and finally, we deliver our conclusions
in Section VI.
II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This section describes our consumption and load profile
model. We also introduce the dynamic pricing mechanism and
define participation rate. As others have proposed previously,
automated intelligent agents can be used to represent con-
sumers in the schedulling, making the entire process seamless
from the consumers’ perspective [5], [9], [13]. Finally, we
define performance metrics used for evaluation. Table I sum-
marizes the key notation used in this and subsequent sections.
A. Consumption Profile
Our proposed consumption model aims to realistically
express and distinguish the different times of the day when
usage groups use appliances as well as the right time to shift
TABLE I. NOTATIONS SUMMARY
Notations Description
N Set of consumers.
A Set of all appliances.
Ai Set of appliances owned by consumer i.
T Set of time slots during a day.
Ui,a Consumer i’s consumption profile for appliance a ∈ A〉.
ui,aj The j
th usage group of consumer i for appliance a.
Si,aj Set of possible starting times of consumer i’s appliance a for load
shifting.
si,aj The normal starting time of appliance a preferred by consumer i.
di,aj The usage duration of consumer i’s appliance a.
li,aj The realization load of consumer i for appliance a in each usage
group.
L(t) The total load of all consumers at time slot t ∈ T .
Li(t) Consumer i’s load at time slot t ∈ T .
ci(t) The cost of consumer i for time slot t.
c(i) The daily cost of consumer i.
ρi The participation rate of consumer i.
that use. Failure to distinguish such usage groups leads to
meaningless schedules.
Example 1: Consider a consumer who needs to schedule
x morning time slots (usage group 1) and y evening time slots
(usage group 2) for appliance a. She declares x+ y time slots
available for load shifting in the morning and x+y time slots in
the evening. A model that fails to distinguish between different
usage groups requirements might schedule x+ y time slots in
the morning (because the morning electricity price is cheaper),
which is unintended.
In addition, we need to schedule an appliance in a contin-
uous range, because turning an appliance off during its usage
time inconveniences the user. However, this does not reduce
the expressiveness of our model. When a consumer intends
discontinuous usage of an appliance, we can use different
usage groups.
Let N be the set of all consumers and A be the set of
all appliances. We denote the set of appliances owned by user
i ∈ N by Ai ⊆ A. Power consumption (in Watts) for each
appliance a ∈ A, is defined as the function w : a → R.
The consumption profile of a consumer i is defined as a set
of usage groups, U i,a, for a ∈ Ai . Let T = {t1, . . . , tn}
denote a set of time slots during a day. We hence define each
usage group ui,aj ∈ U i,a, for 1 ≤ j ≤ |U i,a|, as a tuple
(Si,aj , s
i,a
j , d
i,a
j ), where S
i,a
j ⊆ T is the set of possible starting
times for load-shifting, si,aj ∈ Si,aj is the consumer’s preferred
normal starting time, and di,aj ∈ R is the usage duration of
appliance a (in hours). Appliance a of consumer i is:
(i) shiftable within usage group ui,aj , if {si,aj } ⊂ Si,aj , and
(ii) non-shiftable within usage group ui,aj , if {si,aj } = Si,aj .
B. Load
The realized load of consumer i for appliance a in each
usage group ui,aj ∈ U i,a, denoted as li,aj = (li,aj,1, . . . , li,aj,|T |), is
her actual energy consumption in watt-hours (Wh). Function
pi : T → R maps time slots to hours. In addition, we require
the realized load to satisfy:
• Starting-time correctness: Let the starting time of li,aj
be denoted by li,aj,I , where ∀x, 0 ≤ x < I ≤ |T |,
li,aj,x = 0. We require l
i,a
j,I ∈ Si,aj .
• Duration correctness: (∑|T |y=1 li,aj,y) = di,aj · w(a).
• Load continuity: ∀x ≤ y, if li,aj,x 6= 0 ∧ li,aj,y 6= 0, then
li,aj,z 6= 0 where x < z < y.
• Load maximality: li,aj,t ≤ w(a) · pi(t) for all t ∈ T .
We define the load at time slot t ∈ T for consumer i as:
Li(t) =
∑
a∈Ai
( ∑
ui,aj ∈Ui,a
li,aj,t
)
. (1)
Then, the total load at time slot t ∈ T over all consumers is
L(t) =
∑
i∈N L
i(t).
C. Pricing Mechanism
We require our price function to be a) increasing and b)
strictly convex on the total load for each time slot. Assuming
that consumers prefer lower prices, price functions that satisfy
the requirements above encourage consumers to shift their
consumption from peak time slots to off-peak time slots. An
example of a real energy cost function that satisfies both the
above assumptions is the quadratic cost function for thermal
generators [3], [14], [15]:
p(L(t)) = c1L(t)
2 + c2L(t) + c3. (2)
However, any function satisfying the two requirements above
can also be used.
The cost to consumer i for time slot t is calculated as
proportional to her load over total load at a time slot t:
ci(t) =
Li(t)
L(t)
p(L(t)). (3)
The daily cost to consumer i is the sum of her costs over all
time slots:
c(i) =
∑
t∈T
ci(t). (4)
Since time slots with higher loads will be charged at a higher
price, the consumer whose objective is to minimize cost will
be encouraged to shift consumption to the time slot with
the lowest load. Note that a consumer does not require a
detailed knowledge of other consumers’ consumption. The
only information needed by consumer i to minimize c(i), is
the price function and the aggregate load of all consumers for
each time slot, L(t), which the energy company communicates
to consumers.
D. Participation Rate
Given the cost function c(i) in Eq. 4, a rational consumer
would aim to minimize costs, i.e., choose the realized load
li,aj , for all u
i,a
j ∈ U i,a and for all a ∈ Ai, such that
c(i) is minimized. However, if a majority of consumers alter
their consumption at the same time, moving to less loaded
time slots, these time slots might become the new peaks. To
avoid this peak-shifting problem, we introduce the notion of
participation rate, which is the probability that a consumer
will alter her consumption schedule. For each consumer i, we
denote ρi ∈ R as her participation rate, where 0 ≤ ρi ≤ 1.
E. Performance Metrics
We evaluate the DSM system’s performance using two
metrics, which are also used below in the experimental section
of this paper.
1) Peak to average ratio: We measure DSM system’s
performance by how much we can reduce the peak load. One
widely used measurement is peak to average ratio (PAR): the
day’s peak load divided by the average load on the day. Using
our model, we define:
PAR =
|T |∑
t∈T L(t)
max
t∈T
L(t) (5)
In general, a high peak load (relative to the average) results
in a high PAR. Hence, a lower PAR is preferable. Another
commonly used metric, called load factor, is 1PAR . However,
in the sequel, we use PAR instead. We denote PARx(k) as
the PAR of the DSM system x at day k. Even though PAR
can be highly effective measure DSM system performance on
a particular day, there is difficulty in deciding which system
is better (lower PAR) than the other when their daily PARs
overlap.
Example 2 (Overlapping PAR): Consider two DSM sys-
tems, A and B. Assume that PARA(k) = 2, if k is odd,
and PARA(k) = 4, if k is even. Furthermore, PARB(k) = 5,
if k is odd, and PARB(k) = 3, if k is even. A snapshot of the
system on day 1 suggests A is better than B, while snapshot
on day 2 suggests the opposite.
2) Area under PAR curve: The area under PAR curve
(AUP) metric is more appropriate when dealing with multiple
DSM systems exhibiting the overlapping PARs problem above.
Given a set of measurements of system x on a set of days
D, we define the AUP of x as the the sum of its PARs, i.e.
AUPx(D) =
∑
i∈D
PARx(i) (6)
A DSM system x is better than y relative to a set of days D
if AUPx(D) < AUPy(D).
Example 3: Consider again DSM systems A and B from
Example 2. Given a set of days D = {1, . . . , 100}, we know
that A is better than B for the period D, because AUPA(D) =
300 and AUPB(D) = 400.
III. FINDING NEAR-OPTIMAL STRATEGY DISTRIBUTION
Consumers’ strategy distribution is defined as a distribution
of participation rates adopted by the consumers. It is optimal
if it brings the system to its optimum performance (based on a
predefined metric), given consumers’ consumption profiles. A
key question we then need to answer is, how can one find the
best strategy distribution according to a predefined objective?
When we consider the possibility of assigning a particular
participation rate – which is a real number – to each consumer,
we face a problem with an infinite space. In order to be able
to explore the solution space, we make the participation rate
discrete. We use a Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) with Up-
per Confidence-bounds applied to Trees (UCT) to find a near-
optimal solution [16]. The method is widely known through
its application in multi-armed bandit problem [16] and general
game playing [17]. While the basic idea of MCTS is to traverse
the representation tree in a random fashion, the role of UCT
is to guide these random traversals. Instead of a completely
random exploration of the tree, we gradually explore good
branches (exploitation). After a number of exploitations on the
good branches, the algorithm switches to explore bad branches
(in case there was an unexplored good branch there).
Problem definition: Given a set of possible participation
rates P = {ri | ri ∈ R, 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1}, assignment granularity
of g ∈ N, and assignment 0 ≤ vi ≤ g, we must compute
the fraction fi = vig of consumers for each ri ∈ P such that
assigning fi of consumers’ satisfies the predefined objective
(e.g., minimum PAR).
A. Strategy-Tree
We cast the problem of finding the best possible strategy
distribution into a tree state-space search problem. The key
idea is the gradual assignment of a fraction of consumers to
a particular participation rate until all consumers have been
assigned to a particular participation rate. As we explore the
next level of the tree, the chosen child represents a proportion
of consumers assigned to a particular participation rate, i.e.,
the choice made at level k defines the fraction fi of consumers
who will be assigned participation rate rk. When we arrive at
the leaf, it means that all consumers have been assigned to
their respective participation rates. The quality of the solution
found is a function of the path that we choose to traverse the
tree from the root to the leaf.
Definition 4 (Strategy-Tree): Let the set of possible par-
ticipation rates be P = {ri | ri ∈ R, 0 ≤ ri ≤ 1}, and the
assignment granularity be g ∈ N. This determines the fine-
grained fraction of consumers assigned to participation rates.
• Node. A node α in the tree is a set {vα1 , . . . , vα|P | |
vαi ∈ N, 0 ≤ vαi ≤ g, 1 ≤ i ≤ |P |}, where vαi denotes
a fraction v
α
i
g of the consumers assigned to ri.
• Root. The root r of the tree is a node in level 0 and
has zero assignment for all elements, i.e. vri = 0, for
1 ≤ i ≤ |P |.
• Node sum. For a node α, we denote the sum of its
assignment as σ(α) =
∑|P |
i=1 v
α
i ≤ g .
• Leaf. A node α in the tree is a leaf, if σ(α) = g.
• Children. Each non-leaf node α at level k has
g − σ(α) + 1 children, i.e. γ0(α), . . . , γ(g−σ(α))(α).
If γj(α) is a non-leaf node, then γj(α) =
{vα1 , . . . , vαk+1 + j, . . . , vα|P |}. Intuitively, choosing
γj(α) means that we assign jg of consumers to the
participation rate rk ∈ P , i.e., fk = jg . Hence, the
depth of the tree is bounded by |P |.
Example 5: Assume that we have P = {0.0, 0.3, 0.7, 1.0},
and g = 10. Then, we have r = (0, 0, 0, 0) as the root. The
root r has 11 children, i.e. γ0(r), . . . , γ10(r), where v
γj(r)
1 = j,
and vγj(r)i = 0, for 2 ≤ i ≤ 4 and 0 ≤ j ≤ 10.
B. Node Value
For a non-leaf node α, its valuation Q(α) is defined as the
average of the value of its children. For a leaf node, its value
is determined by evaluating the participation-rate distribution
encoded in the node with a DSM simulation for a specific
duration (e.g., our experiments simulate a 365-days period).
Let ρi be the participation rate of consumer i. At each
simulation step, consumer i with probability ρi adjusts her con-
sumption schedule, i.e., realized load (defined in Section II-B)
to minimize her cost c(i) as in Eq. 4. Once the simulation is
finished, the system performance (such as PAR or AUP) is set
as the value of this leaf node.
Another key strength of UCT is that, since the evaluation
here can be based on any predefined metrics, we can tailor
it to match any objective we have in mind. As we will show
below (see Section IV), we focus on PAR (and AUP) since it
is widely used in the literature. We can also use other metrics
if needed, such as utilitarian social welfare (total cost), or
egalitarian social welfare (maximum cost of a consumer).
C. Tree Traversal
For a node α, we define Γ(α) as the set of all children of
α. Given that γ ∈ Γ(α), we define:
• Q(γ) as the valuation of γ,
• N(α) as the number of times we visit α,
• N(α, γ) as the number of times we visit γ from α.
From α, the next child to be visited, γ∗, is chosen by:
γ∗ = argmaxγ∈Γ(α)
{
Q(γ) + θ
√
ln(N(α))
N(α, γ)
}
(7)
The above equation captures the balance of exploration
and exploitation of UCT. On one side, the first term, Q(γ),
captures the quality of the next child (the higher the value,
the better the node), and increases the chance that it will be
visited (exploitation of good nodes). On the other side, the
fewer visits to a child, the larger the value of the second term.
This increases its chance to be visited (exploration of under-
visited nodes). Thus, θ is the balancing parameter to adjust
how aggressive the exploration is.
D. Regularization
1) Laziness: Lower participation rates means less frequent
consumption schedule changes. Adopting a low participation
rate strategy while maintaining high benefit (low energy cost)
is attractive to consumers. Hence, a solution that assigns more
consumers to low participation rates (laziness property) is
desirable.
Let ρi be a participation rate adopted by consumer i. For a
DSM system x, and its set of consumers Nx, its laziness score
is defined as the average of the participation rates adopted, i.e.
λ(x) =
∑
i∈Nx ρi
|Nx| . (8)
Given two systems x and y, x is lazier than y if λ(x) < λ(y).
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2) Regularization: In order to have a lazier system, we
introduce a regularization parameter to our UCT approach by
slightly modifying the selection mechanism of the next child to
be visited. The lazier the system encoded in a node, the lower
the penalty incurred (see the second term of Eq. 9). Given α
as the current node, P as the set of possible participation rates,
and γ = {vγ1 , . . . , vγ|P |} ∈ Γ(α) as a child of α, we replace
Q(γ) in Eq. 7 with Qλ(γ), where
Qλ(γ) = Q(γ)−
∑|P |
i=1(v
γ
i · ri)∑|P |
i=1 v
γ
i
. (9)
The first term is the valuation of γ, The second term is the
laziness score calculation of the system encoded in γ.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Our experiments use hourly time slots throughout the day,
i.e. T = {1, . . . 24}. Unless otherwise stated, we set the
number of consumers as |N | = 100. The dataset we use to
plot Figure 1 does not have a more detailed customer load
profile, such as appliance-level measurement. Thus, we define
the consumers’ consumption profiles based on [18], [19]. See
Table II for example.1 In addition, as background knowledge,
we add several usage groups and load shifting constraints. For
the price function, we set c1 = 0.01, c2 = 2, c3 = 100 (see
Eq. 2). However, as we mention in Section II, any increasing
and strictly convex function of the total load for each time slot
can also be used. The simulation is set to 365 days.
A. Parameter Tuning
1) UCT configuration: This experiment investigates which
value of θ (see Section III-C about Tree Traversal) will give us
the best result. We measure UCT performance based on AUP
using different θ, i.e., θ = 1, θ = 10, θ = 100, θ = 500, and
θ = 1000. We do not try θ > 1000 because our experiments
show that the maximum AUP reached by the system is around
850; hence, giving θ = 1000 is more than sufficient for the
exploration. We use a set of possible participation rates P =
{0.0, 0.1, . . . 1.0} and we run the experiments up to 1,000 tree
traversals for each θ setting.
Figure 3 shows that the AUPs flatten out after 80 traversals
and remain stable up to 1,000 traversals. For the rest of the
experiments, we use θ = 1000. Up to 1,000 traversals, θ =
1Our source code is available at https://github.com/tritritri/effective-dsm
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100, θ = 500, or θ = 1000 give us equal performance, and are
better than θ = 1, or θ = 10. For the rest of the experiments,
we use θ = 500.
2) Set of possible participation rates: In this experiments,
we investigate the impact of the granularity of the set of
possible participation rates. We set three different granularities,
i.e., P1 = {0.0, 0.1, . . . , 1.0}, P2 = {0.0, 0.05, . . . , 1.0},
and P3 = {0.0, 0.02, . . . 1.0}. Figure 4 shows that using P1
the PAR decreases rapidly in the beginning, but P2 and P3
outperform it in the long run.
In order to have a better understanding of the distribution
of participation rate among consumers, we plot its cumulative
distribution. Figure 5 shows that in P1, P2, and P3 more than
90% of consumers are assigned to a participation rate of 0.1
or less, and we assign no consumers to high participation rates
(> 0.5). This means that our solution has the desirable property
of assigning the majority of consumers to low participation
rates (infrequent schedule changes).
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TABLE II. CONSUMER CONSUMPTION PROFILE EXAMPLE
Appliance Usage groups Possible starting time Normal starting time Duration
Microwave
usage group 1 07:00 - 09:00 07:00 15 minutes
usage group 2 18:00 - 21:00 19:00 20 minutes
Television usage group 1 19:00 - 22:00 20:00 1 hour 30 minutes
Washing machine usage group 1 16:00 - 22:00 19:00 1 hour 25 minutes
Light (non-shiftable) usage group 1 18:00 18:00 7 hours
Dishwashwer usage group 1 02:00 - 16:00, 21:00 - 23:00 21:00 40 minutes
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B. Price Fairness
The participation rate is a new concept in efforts to help
reduce PAR and avoid peak-shifting due to the herding effect.
However, one might suspect that different participation rates
might introduce price unfairness among consumers. Figure 6
shows the price paid by consumers grouped by participation
rates. We take the distribution of participation rates obtained
for P3 (see Figure 5) for 1,000 consumers on 365 days. At
the end of day 365, we group the consumers having the same
participation rate and compute the average price paid per kWh
(kilowatt-hour) for each group.
The average price paid per kWh by different participation
rate groups was 0.1510 with a standard deviation 0.0007. This
fairness (especially for consumers with a low participation
rate) is brought about because as long as there are consumers
who shift from the peak time slot, the price for that slot will
decrease (the price for the other slots will slightly increase).
As a result, the price difference between slots also decrease.
C. The Herding Effect and Other Approaches
Figure 7 shows the PAR results due to the herding effect
(denoted as all response). When we have the herding effect,
instead of converging to the minimum, the PAR of the system
oscillates. Figure 7 also shows the result found by UCT, and
other approaches, i.e., assigning a participation rate 0.05 to all
consumers [13] (denoted as uniform 0.05), and allowing only
one consumer per day to change her consumption schedule [3]
(denoted as turn-taking). We run the experiments with 1,000
consumers over 365 days.
The performance of the solution found by UCT and uni-
form 0.05 outperform turn-taking. This is because the response
of one consumer per day has too little effect on the system.
The PARs shown by both, UCT and uniform 0.05, are very
competitive (with AUP measured 418.2 and 419.18 respec-
tively). In the solution found by UCT, more than 87% of the
population has participation rate 0.06 or less. While Ramchurn
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Fig. 8. PAR measured on static and dynamic environment with 20% and
70% usage deviation. Eventually, their PAR reach about the same level. We
have more oscillation on the environment with higher usage deviation.
et al. shows empirically that participation rates should be
reasonably small [13], we validate it here algorithmically. In
addition, our proposal to introduce non-uniform participation
rates enables us to accommodate a population with different
levels of willingness to participate (which is more realistic) in
a DSM program.
D. Dynamic Environments
These experiments evaluate the participation rate distribu-
tion found by UCT using P3 in dynamic environments(see
Figure 5), where appliance usage durations vary from day to
day (as in the real world). Here, we define x% usage deviation
as a range [− x100di,aj ,+ x100di,aj ] that consumer i can add to her
normal duration, di,aj , of using appliance a within usage group
ui,aj (defined in Section II-A).
Figure 8 shows that although all settings eventually reach
roughly the same PAR, systems with higher deviation have
more unstable PAR. On one hand, this shows that our solution
also works to lower PAR in dynamic environments. On the
other hand, this is a warning to the energy companies: assum-
ing that the deployment of a DSM tool is successful and we
enjoy low PAR, back-up generators are still needed to satisfy
the demand levels of any unexpected peak-loads that may
occur. The performance of UCT compared to other approaches
in this environment exhibits the same pattern as in Figure 7,
where UCT and uniform 0.05 have similar performance, but
they both outperform turn-taking.
E. Regularization and Laziness
The main reason for having regularization and laziness in
the system is because lower participation rates are preferable
(less response needed). To analyze the system further, under
different regularization parameters, we run experiments with
β = 10, β = 100 and without regularization, i.e., β = 0.
Figure 9 shows that by applying β = 100, almost half of
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Fig. 9. Cumulative distribution of participation rate assigned by UCT with
different regularization parameter β. There is no assignment for participation
rate larger than 0.5.
consumers are assigned to participation rate 0.02 (almost half
of consumers need to respond once every 50 days).
In the regularized version of UCT, we introduce a penalty
term when evaluating the leaf nodes, which might not allow
the optimal solution selection. Thus, we should observe the
AUP of the systems before making any further conclusion.
At the end of day 365, AUPs of the system with β = 0,
β = 10, β = 100 are 421.84, 422.63, and 459.54 respectively.
We observe an almost 10% difference between the system with
β = 0 and β = 100. Depending on how DSM stakeholders
value laziness, one might adjust the β higher or lower as a
trade-off between an optimal (in terms of PAR or AUP) or a
lazy system.
V. RELATED WORK
Palensky and Dietrich [20] and Strbac [21] gave an
overview of DSM. Mohsenian-Rad et al. proposed a game
theoretic model for DSM, and proved the systems’ conver-
gence [3]. In order to deal with the herding effect, they
proposed turn-taking mechanisms, which require a centralized
control. Li, Chen, and Low extended this model by taking into
account consumer utility and inconvenience [2]. In our model,
a consumer can define her flexibility to shift consumption
in time. Within these shiftability constraints, no deterioration
of utility is assumed. Ramchurn et al. proposed to set all
consumers’ participation rate to 0.05 and showed empirically
that the herding effect can be handled using a small enough
participation rate [13]. In this study, we extend their work
by solving the herding effect algorithmically and offering a
framework for DSM designers to adjust their systems towards
either consumer convenience or system performance.
Previous works have proposed using additional devices for
DSM. Vytelingum et al. [5] and Mishra et al. [22] presented
a DSM mechanism which assumed the existence of energy
storage on consumers’ premises. Ganu et al. developed a
device called nPlug, which can perform scheduling and voltage
sensing to identify peak and off-peak periods on the grid [23].
The large battery capacity of future fleets of electric vehi-
cles (EVs) has been considered as a significant extra load that
will have to be satisfied. Charging one EV battery can consume
32kWh (comparable to one household’s daily consumption)
in just a few hours [24], [25]. Too many EVs charging their
batteries simultaneously could create a new peak load. Several
approaches have been proposed to mitigate this [26], [27], [28].
However, instead of seeing EVs as one of the future’s key
challenges, the Vehicle-to-Grid (V2G) concept sees them as
an opportunity: their battery capacity could be leveraged for
DSM by discharging power back into the grid when supply is
short [29], [30], [31].
VI. CONCLUSION
We used Monte Carlo Tree Search with UCT to find
near-optimal (non-uniform) participation rate distributions to
address the problem of peak-shifting caused by the herding
effect. In addition, we exploited the laziness property of a DSM
system to have more consumers assigned to low participation
rates. A low participation rate means less frequent schedule
changes. Thus, the lazier the system, the more convenient it
is for consumers. However, laziness comes at a price – it
reduces system performance. For this purpose, we provided a
regularization parameter which can be used to align the system
towards performance or laziness.
With respect to previous approaches in the literature, our
method combines the best of both worlds: it enables a fast
convergence solution (as in uniform 0.05), and admits less
frequent schedule changes (as in turn-taking). In addition,
we validated algorithmically the result found empirically by
[13]. We also demonstrated that our solution ensures the price
fairness property. In the future, we plan to (i) provide a
mechanism to maintain the participation rate distribution in
the population, (ii) obtain the desirable properties using a dis-
tributed or evolutionary mechanism, and (iii) convert the load
data into symbolic representation to reduce data numerosity
and granularity (which also gives additional privacy protection
for consumers) [32].
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Errata of the paper:
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Eq. 9 should be:
Qλ(γ) = Q(γ)− β
∑|P |
i=1(v
γ
i · ri)∑|P |
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γ
i
.
In the original paper, β is missing.
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